1. Introduction
The Vacron NVR web interface detection indicates that a web server associated with a Vacron network video recorder is accessible on the remote host. This presents a potential attack surface, as these interfaces are often targeted due to known vulnerabilities and default credentials. Successful compromise could lead to unauthorized access to video feeds and potentially wider network access. The likely impact is medium for confidentiality, low for integrity, and low for availability.
2. Technical Explanation
Nessus detected the presence of a web interface typically used for managing Vacron network video recorders. This suggests that the device’s management console is exposed to the network. Attackers can attempt to exploit known vulnerabilities in the web interface, or use default credentials to gain access. There are no publicly assigned CVEs specifically for this detection at the time of writing.
- Root cause: The Vacron NVR web interface is accessible from a network location.
- Exploit mechanism: An attacker could attempt brute-force attacks against default or weak credentials, or exploit known vulnerabilities in the web application itself to gain control of the device. For example, an attacker might use common username/password combinations like ‘admin’/’admin’.
- Scope: Vacron network video recorders with a web interface enabled are affected. Specific models and firmware versions were not identified by Nessus during this detection.
3. Detection and Assessment
Confirming the presence of the web interface is the first step in assessing vulnerability. A quick check can determine if it’s accessible, while a more thorough scan will identify specific models.
- Quick checks: Use a web browser to access the IP address on port 80 or 443. If the Vacron login page appears, the interface is present.
- Scanning: Nessus vulnerability scans with updated plugins can detect this issue (Plugin ID 16295). Other scanners may have similar capabilities.
- Logs and evidence: Check web server logs for requests to the IP address of the NVR on ports 80 or 443. Look for patterns associated with Vacron login attempts.
curl -I http://[NVR_IP_ADDRESS]4. Solution / Remediation Steps
The primary solution is to restrict access to the web interface or disable it if not required. If access is needed, strengthen credentials and keep firmware updated.
4.1 Preparation
- Ensure you have documented the current IP address and network settings for roll back purposes. A simple reboot can usually restore previous settings.
- Changes should be made during a scheduled maintenance window with appropriate approval from IT management.
4.2 Implementation
- Step 1: Log in to the Vacron NVR web interface using existing credentials.
- Step 2: Navigate to the network settings section of the interface.
- Step 3: If possible, disable remote access to the web interface entirely.
- Step 4: If disabling is not an option, restrict access to a limited range of trusted IP addresses using firewall rules.
- Step 5: Change the default username and password to strong, unique values.
4.3 Config or Code Example
Before
Default Username: admin
Default Password: adminAfter
Username: [Strong, Unique Username]
Password: [Strong, Unique Password]4.4 Security Practices Relevant to This Vulnerability
Several security practices can mitigate this risk. Least privilege limits the impact of compromise, while strong passwords and regular patching reduce the likelihood of successful attacks.
- Practice 1: Implement least privilege by restricting access to sensitive systems like NVRs only to authorized personnel.
- Practice 2: Enforce strong password policies with complexity requirements and regular rotation.
4.5 Automation (Optional)
Automation is unlikely for this specific issue without a Vacron-provided API. Scripting firewall changes may be possible, but requires careful testing.
# Example Bash script to block access from untrusted IPs (requires firewall configuration)
# iptables -A INPUT -s [Untrusted IP Range] -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP
# iptables -A INPUT -s [Untrusted IP Range] -p tcp --dport 443 -j DROP5. Verification / Validation
Confirm the fix by verifying restricted access and checking for default credentials. A service smoke test ensures basic functionality remains.
- Post-fix check: Attempt to access the web interface from an untrusted IP address. Access should be denied.
- Re-test: Re-run the Nessus scan. The vulnerability should no longer be reported.
- Smoke test: Verify that authorized users can still log in and view live video feeds.
- Monitoring: Check firewall logs for blocked access attempts to ports 80 and 443 from untrusted sources.
curl -I http://[NVR_IP_ADDRESS] # Should return a connection refused or access denied error6. Preventive Measures and Monitoring
Regular security assessments, patch management, and network segmentation can prevent similar issues. For example, regularly scan for open ports and vulnerable services.
- Baselines: Update your security baseline to include requirements for strong passwords and restricted access on all network devices.
- Pipelines: Integrate vulnerability scanning into your CI/CD pipeline to identify exposed interfaces early in the development process.
- Asset and patch process: Implement a regular patch management cycle for all NVRs, applying firmware updates promptly.
7. Risks, Side Effects, and Roll Back
Restricting access could disrupt legitimate users if not configured correctly. Incorrect firewall rules may block necessary traffic.
- Risk or side effect 2: Service disruption if the web interface is disabled and required for management. Mitigation: Ensure alternative management methods are available.
- Roll back: Re-enable remote access in the NVR’s network settings, and remove any restrictive firewall rules. Reboot the device if necessary.
8. References and Resources
- Vendor advisory or bulletin: http://www.vacron.com