1. Introduction
The Arista CloudVision Portal Web Detection indicates that the web interface for Arista CloudVision Portal is running on a remote host. This portal provides a web-based GUI for managing the CloudVision platform, and its exposure to the internet or untrusted networks can create an attack surface. Successful exploitation could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to the management plane of network devices. Confidentiality, integrity, and availability may be impacted if compromised.
2. Technical Explanation
The vulnerability stems from the presence of a web interface exposed on a network. While not an inherent flaw in CloudVision Portal itself, its accessibility presents a risk. Attackers can attempt to exploit known vulnerabilities within the web application or use it as a pivot point for further attacks. Exploitation requires network connectivity to the portal and successful authentication if enabled.
- Root cause: The web interface is accessible from an untrusted network, increasing the attack surface.
- Exploit mechanism: An attacker could attempt brute-force login attempts or exploit known vulnerabilities in the CloudVision Portal web application.
- Scope: Arista CloudVision Portal installations with a publicly accessible web interface are affected.
3. Detection and Assessment
Confirming the presence of the web interface is the primary assessment step. A thorough method involves checking for open ports and running services associated with the portal.
- Quick checks: Use `nmap -p 80,443
` to check if ports 80 and 443 are open. - Scanning: Nessus plugin ID 16792 can detect the Arista CloudVision Portal web interface (example only).
- Logs and evidence: Review web server logs for access attempts to the portal’s URL.
nmap -p 80,443 4. Solution / Remediation Steps
The primary solution is to restrict network access to the CloudVision Portal web interface. This can be achieved through firewall rules or VPN access.
4.1 Preparation
- No services need to be stopped for this remediation, but careful planning is required to avoid disrupting legitimate access.
4.2 Implementation
- Step 1: Configure the firewall to allow access to ports 80 and 443 only from trusted networks or VPN subnets.
- Step 2: Verify that access is blocked from all other networks.
4.3 Config or Code Example
Before
# Allow access from any source (example firewall rule)
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -j ACCEPT
After
# Allow access only from trusted network (example firewall rule)
iptables -A INPUT -s / -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -s / -p tcp --dport 443 -j ACCEPT
# Deny access from all other sources
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -j DROP
4.4 Security Practices Relevant to This Vulnerability
Several security practices can help mitigate this vulnerability type. Least privilege is key, limiting access only to authorized users and networks. Network segmentation further isolates the portal from potential threats.
- Practice 1: Implement least privilege by restricting network access based on the principle of need-to-know.
- Practice 2: Use network segmentation to isolate sensitive systems like CloudVision Portal from less trusted parts of the network.
4.5 Automation (Optional)
If using infrastructure as code, update firewall rules through your automation platform.
# Example Ansible playbook snippet
- name: Restrict access to CloudVision Portal
firewalld:
port: 80/tcp
permanent: true
state: enabled
zone: trusted_network
source: /
5. Verification / Validation
Confirm the fix by verifying that access is blocked from untrusted networks and allowed only from authorized sources. A smoke test should confirm legitimate users can still access the portal.
- Post-fix check: Use `nmap -p 80,443
` from an untrusted network; ports should be filtered or closed. - Re-test: Repeat the initial nmap scan to confirm that access is restricted as expected.
- Smoke test: Log in to the CloudVision Portal web interface from a trusted source to verify functionality.
- Monitoring: Monitor firewall logs for blocked connection attempts to ports 80 and 443 from unexpected sources.
nmap -p 80,443 6. Preventive Measures and Monitoring
Regular security baselines should include network access restrictions for sensitive systems. CI/CD pipelines can incorporate checks to prevent accidental exposure of web interfaces. A robust patch management process ensures timely updates to address vulnerabilities in the underlying CloudVision Portal software.
- Baselines: Update your security baseline to require restricted network access for all web-based GUIs.
- Pipelines: Add checks to CI/CD pipelines to ensure that new deployments do not inadvertently expose sensitive ports or services.
- Asset and patch process: Implement a regular review cycle for asset inventory and patch management, prioritizing critical systems like CloudVision Portal.
7. Risks, Side Effects, and Roll Back
- Roll back: Revert the firewall configuration to its previous state, restoring access from all networks.
8. References and Resources
- Vendor advisory or bulletin: https://www.arista.com/en/cg-cv/cv-cloudvision-portal-cvp-overview
- NVD or CVE entry: Not applicable, as this is a configuration issue rather than a specific vulnerability.
- Product or platform documentation relevant to the fix: https://www.arista.com/en/support/documentation